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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY J. REHN,

APPELLEE'S BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 970700-CA

vs.

Priority 15

CHARLES C. REHN,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant Charles C. Rehn has appealed a Decree of Divorce entered by the Third
District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE 1: The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount
and length of its alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines;
and for its award of attorney's fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Any award of property, alimony, child support, and
attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court and such an award will not
be disturbed unless the trial court's findings amounted to an abuse of discretion. Boyle
1

v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987); Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); see
also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) (relating the standard to an award of
alimony); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989) (relating the
standard to an award of attorney's fees).
ISSUE 2: The trial court erred in excluding Charles Rehn's witness regarding
Mary Rehn's underemployment and income potential.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Trial courts are given broad discretion in managing
their cases, and the Utah Court of Appeals will not interfere with that management unless
it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co.,
Inc., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992); citing Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah
1980).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth in full in
Addendum A attached to this Brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1997)
Utah R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) (1987)
Utah R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) (1987)
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-502 (1996)
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce of a long-term marriage, the Divorce Decree signed by the
Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, in Summit County, Utah, and entered in the
Court's records on September 26, 1997.
The parties were married on August 27,1977, and at the time of trial on August 14,
1997, had been married nearly 20 years. (Tr. 2, 10, 124).
There were two (2) children born of the marriage: Kyle, d.o.b. 3/11/88, who was
nine years old at the time of trial; and, Shawn, d.o.b. 3/12/91, who was six years old at the
time of trial. (Tr. 12-13).
The facts were uncontroverted that Mary Rehn was the primary caretaker of the
minor children, and had structured her employment around the children's school and
activities. In fact, Mary had gone so far as to work all holidays, weekends and evenings
when Charles Rehn was present to care for the children, so as to help the family with child
care payments. (Tr. 14-18, 22, 36, 39-43, 121-122).
The parties had established their marriage as Mary being the in-home caretaker of
the children and Charles the outside wage earner. (Tr. 46-47, 121-122, 125).
At the time of trial, Charles was earning $82,000 a year, which constituted
approximately 80 percent of the family income and $6833 per month gross. (Tr. 63-74,
121).
Mary, through a series of part-time jobs, earned $17,154 for the year prior to trial,
3

which was approximately 20 percent of the family income, and resulted in a gross monthly
income of $1429. (Tr. 63, 121).
Child support was set by the parties by Stipulation in the amount of $1045 to be
paid by Charles to Mary. This amount was confirmed in the Findings and Decree, and a
child support schedule was attached as an exhibit to those documents. (Tr. 5, 63-64, 122,
Findings of Fact, T[ 18-19, Decree of Divorce, ]f 5).
Alimony was ordered by the Court to be paid by Charles to Mary in the amount of
$1200. Charles' total financial obligation to Mary for child support and alimony was
$2245, approximately 33 percent of his gross monthly income. (Tr. 125).
Since the trial, Charles has entered an Appeal contesting the Court's Orders
concerning the amount and length of alimony, the alleged deviation from child support
guidelines, the award of attorney's fees to Mary from Charles, and alleges the Court erred
in excluding Charles' expert witness.

SUMMARY OF THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
For his first issue on appeal, Charles Rehn argues, basically, that every financial
element of the trial court's findings and order was an abuse of discretion. Mr. Rehn
argues that the award alimony, the amount of child support, the division of the parties
debts, and the award of attorneys fees were all an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The essence of Mr. Rehn's argument is that the trial court failed to make sufficient
4

findings to support these awards. In response, Ms. Rehn first argues that to the degree
these arguments raise factual issues already resolved by, and within, the sound discretion
of the trial court, they should not be relitigated at the appellate court level. To the degree
these arguments legitimately address an abuse of discretion by the trial court, Ms. Rehn
argues that the trial court made sufficient findings to support these awards. Judge Brian,
perhaps anticipating the likelihood of appeal, carefully reviewed the evidence presented
by both parties, and then made a series of detailed findings regarding the expenses of the
parties, the need of assistance by Ms. Rehn and her children, and the ability of Mr. Rehn
to assist and provide for these expenses. In responding to Mr. Rehn's arguments, Ms.
Rehn argues that there were sufficient findings to support the award and, therefore, no
abuse of discretion occurred.
For his second issue, Charles Rehn argues that the trial court erred in excluding a
'Vocational" expert from testifying at trial. Ms. Rehn respectfully argues, in response, that
there is no law, judicial or statutory, that allows an attorney to give notice to opposing
counsel that he is supplementing his witness list to include a new expert one day before
trial. This is particularly the case where the attorney admits that it was his responsibility
to obtain the expert witness and he failed to do so, simply because the parties were trying
to settle the case. Ms. Rehn will argue that the trial court acted within its discretion, and
within the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration,
in excluding the expert witness.
5

ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1: The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount
and length of its alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines;
and for its award of attorney's fees.
A.

Award of Alimony.

Charles Rehn, in his appeal, attacks the Third District Court's award of permanent
alimony to Mary Rehn in the amount of $1200 per month. Courts have long recognized
that the purpose of such support is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96,
100 (Utah 1986). In a divorce action, the trial court has considerable discretion in
awarding alimony and, on appeal, this discretion will not be disturbed "absent a showing
of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Paffel 732 P.2d at 100; Rashband v.
Rashband, 725 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is an abuse of discretion not to consider:
(1) the financial condition and the needs of the spouse requesting alimony, (2) the ability
of the spouse seeking alimony to provide sufficient income for him or herself, and (3) the
ability of payor spouse to provide that support for the requesting spouse. Paffel 732 P.2d
at 100-101. However, "so long as the record is clear that the trial court has considered
these three factors, we will not disturb its determination regarding alimony unless it has
6

clearly abused its discretion."

Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah

App. 1992). Judge Brian, in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, found that the
parties had been married 20 years and, therefore, alimony was appropriate. (Findings, ^[
30). In reviewing the financial condition and needs of Mary Rehn, Judge Brian referred
to Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, which sets out — in detail — Ms. Rehn's monthly expenses.
(Findings, f 32). The Court then found these expenses reasonable and real, and that the
needs of Ms. Rehn and her two children were approximately $3300 per month. (Findings,
f 7,32-33). The Court further noted that $3300 per month in expenses is not unreasonable
for a mother and two children, particularly when the expenses associated with the children
would increase as the children grew in age. (Findings, Tf 7).
In reviewing the ability of Ms. Rehn to provide income for herself and her two
children, Judge Brian found that Ms. Rehn has been willing to provide for herself and her
family. Specifically, he found that she has worked weekends and holidays to provide for
her family (Findings, % 11), and she has earned, while working as industriously as
possible, $1072 per month in income from her various jobs. (Findings, ^j 34). The Court
further noted that the emphasis of the parties has been to ensure that the children were
I
properly cared for by their mother (Findings, ^f 16), that Ms. Rehn had historically been
the primary caretaker of the children (Findings, ^f 14), and that despite that:
[she] has scrounged for multiple jobs, some of them perhaps less dignified and
less rewarding financially and otherwise than she would have liked to have,
but nevertheless, she has bent her back and gone to work.
7

(Findings, Tf 12). Therefore, the Court concluded, there is "no issue of unemployment or
underemployment based on the historical roles Plaintiff and Defendant have assumed in
this marriage." (Findings, ^f 13).
In considering Charles Rehn's ability to provide alimony for Mary Rehn, Judge
Brian noted that Ms. Rehn had a clear need for assistance and Mr. Rehn had a clear ability
to pay alimony. (Findings, ^ 37). Specifically, where Charles Rehn earns $6833 gross
income per month and Mary Rehn earns $1428 gross income per month (Plaintiffs
Exhibit 2), the Court noted that the ratio of earned income earned between the parties is
approximately 80% for Charles Rehn and 20% for Mary Rehn (Findings, <[j 9). The Court
went on to note that "[historically, and as far as the court can see into the future, the
ability to earn income definitely favors Defendant." (Findings, ^ 13). Finally, the Court
recognized that, because of its order, "the parties are going to have to tighten their belts
and make do with less." (Findings, Tf 20).
Appellee respectfully argues that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
clearly indicate that Judge Brian gave weight to and considered the facts relating to each
of the three factors required by PaffeL The issue then remaining is whether this
consideration amounted to a clear abuse of discretion. Judge Brian considered the income
of both parties and the relationship that these incomes bore one to each other. He
considered the monthly expenses of Mary Rehn and her children, and Ms. Rehn's efforts
and ability to provide for herself and her family. He considered the parties' expenses and
S

the ability of Charles Rehn to pay alimony. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, the Utah
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife
alimony because:
Wife submitted documents reflecting her changing circumstances as she
moved from a family household to a single household. In addition, she
testified at trial that her stated needs amounted to $2272.58 per month. . . .
[T]he court awarded Wife $800 per month alimony, imputed an earning ability
of $1000 per month and awarded her a portion of Husband's military retainer
amounting to $589 per month. Thus, the court's award contemplated that Wife
would receive a monthly income of $2389. That figure is close to Wife's
stated monthly need of $2272.58. In view of the trial court's equitable
distribution of the marital assets and debts, Wife's uncontroverted testimony
regarding her projected needs and past standard of living, and Husband's
ability to pay, we conclude that the court considered the necessary factors.

Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994); see also Rosenbahl v.
Rosenbahl 876 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah App. 1994).
On appeal, Charles Rehn argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to resolve factual discrepancies between Ms. Rehn's testimony and her estimated expenses
as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. The trial court, in exercising its discretion, gave
weight to Ms. Rehn's expenses as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and found they were
reasonable for a mother with two children. Furthermore, Mr. Rehn argues that the trial
court making no findings as to Mr. Rehn's expenses or his ability to pay alimony. Mr.
Rehn argues that his monthly income of $6833 per month is insufficient to pay the $2245
per month in child and spousal support ordered by the trial court, such support being only
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33% of his current gross income.1 The trial court did, in again exercising its discretion,
find that Mr. Rehn's gross monthly income was four times that of Ms. Rehn, and that he
has the ability to pay the support ordered.2
Hill v. Hill [869 P.2d 963, (Utah App. 1994)] addressed the issue of what
constituted adequate findings of a spouse's ability to pay alimony. Mr. Hill argued that
the court did not make the requisite findings on his ability to provide alimony for his exwife. Hill 869 P.2d at 966. He argued that based upon his salary of $1100 per month, a
child support award of $600 per month and an alimony award of $100 per month was an
abuse of discretion because it was simply more than he could afford to pay. Ibid. In
affirming the award of alimony, the appellate court noted that:
Mrs. Hill concedes that the court did not make an express finding on Mr. Hill's
ability to pay, but notes that the court fully considered this factor at trial. Mr.
Hill provided the court with documentation concerning his present and
historical earnings, along with his current expenses. . . .[The alimony]
determination was therefore reasonable, given the remainder of the court's
orders regarding the parties' financial obligations and the court did not abuse
its discretion in making this determination.

1

This Court should note that because of favorable tax treatment afforded the payor of
alimony payments, Mr. Rehn in this case, a payment of $1,200 for alimony or spousal support
equates to an $800 to $900 in out of pocket payment, as the other $300 to $400 would be lost to
the payor to taxes regardless of the alimony award.
2

Appellee notes that while Judge Brian, in his findings, referred specifically to his review
of the parties exhibits (which would include both parties' monthly expenses), he did not list the
monthly budget for each of the parties as a specific finding. Appellee knows of no case requiring
a trial court to make explicit findings regarding the month expenses of the parties in determining
whether alimony should be awarded.
10

Ibid. Mr Rehn was given the opportunity to and did submit a list of his monthly expenses
to the trial court. Judge Brian, in his findings, noted that "the parties are simply going to
have to tighten up their belts and make do with less." (Findings, Tf 20). It is clear from
this statement he considered the expenses of both parties, and the impact of his decision
on these expenses, in making his award of alimony.
Finally, Charles Rehn argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding there
was no issue of underemployment, and in not using Mary Rehn's historical earnings to
impute an income higher than that attributed to her. (Appellant's Brief 13-15). It is
settled law that a trial court may but is not required to impute a higher income to a party
where their historical earnings have been significantly higher and where the party clearly
has the capacity to find employment consistent with their historical earnings. Westenskow
v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, Utah courts have historically
recognized that, where the mother's time is needed at home to provide adequate care and
nurturing for the parties' minor children, it is not necessary to impute full-time
employment income or even any income at all. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1123
(Utah 1980); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992). In Fletcher, the court
noted:

The record in the case will sustain the alimony award as an appropriate sum
for support and maintenance. Plaintiff introduced into evidence a budget
indicating family needs.... Her income was limited by part-time employment
so she might give adequate care and nurturing to the three younger children,
11

ranging in age from four to eight. Defendant had sufficient income to provide
support. The record sustains trial court's finding that the sum awarded for
alimony was reasonable.

Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 1123. In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that an award
of $2000 per month in alimony was not an abuse of discretion despite the trial court's
failure to impute income to the wife. Watson, 837 P.2d at 3. The trial court had found
that there was an "agreement by the parties that [Mrs. Watson] would not work outside the
home but would remain in the home to care for the parties' minor child." Ibid. Based on
that finding, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to "decline to impute any
income to the plaintiff, at least until the child is in school on a full time basis." Ibid.
In the present case, Judge Brian found that Mary Rehn has been the primary
caretaker for the parties' minor children. (Findings, ]f 14, 38; Tr. 122). Furthermore, he
found that "the emphasis of the parties has been properly placed in making sure that the
children have been properly cared for my their mother." (Findings, \ 16; Tr. 122).
Finally, he noted the age of the children, that "the youngest is just barely entering into the
first grade." (Findings, ^j 15). It is clear from the findings of Judge Brian that he properly
considered the factors set forth in Paffel, and in considering those factors, also properly
considered the necessary and important role that Ms. Rehn will have to play as mother of

12

the parties' children.3
Charles Rehn, in appealing the issue of alimony — as well as the various other
issues that he has raised on appeal — raises a plethora of factual issues for the Court of
Appeals' consideration. However, on appeal of these issues, Mr. Rehn is limited to
arguing abuse of discretion and is not allowed to relitigate factual issues within the
discretion of the trial court. In 1997 the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the long standing
principal that alimony issues "are within the sound discretion of the trial court because
of its advantaged position to assess evidence and ascertain facts." Willey v. Willey, 951
P.2d 226 (Utah 1997); citing to Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978).
Furthermore, the Court noted that, while the Court of Appeals reviews these
determinations for abuse of discretion, "considerable deference [should be granted] to the
trial court due to its familiarity with the facts and the evidence." Willey, 951 P.2d 226,
(Utah 1997), citing to Paffel v. Pqffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah App. 1986).
While Ms. Rehn recognizes the Court of Appeals' responsibility to review these
cases for an abuse of discretion by the trial court, she respectfully argues that these factual
issues raised by Charles Rehn were thoughtfully considered by Judge Brian before making

3

Another issue regarding Ms. Rehn's employability ~ and one which Mr. Rehn on appeal
has carefully chosen to ignore — is the physical and psychological damage associated with an
acoustic neurinoma tumor which, when discovered in 1984, had grown into her brain stem. The
tumor was surgically removed but resulted in a loss of hearing in her left ear and a loss of nerve
control in the muscles associated with her mouth. This issue is set forth in detail at Tr. 23-25.
13

his findings. To ask the appellate court to reconsider factual issues such as Ms. Rehn's
employment history or Mr. Rehn's income and expenses, after Judge Brian has already
considered these issues and made specific findings relating to them, seeks to invade that
province of factual determination rightfully left to the trial court. The findings clearly
indicate that Judge Brian carefully considered the three factors in Paffel, that he
articulated specific findings relative to those three factors, and then issued an award of
alimony consistent with Ms. Rehn's needs and Mr. Rehn's ability to pay.
For these reasons set forth above, there was clearly no abuse of discretion in
awarding alimony in this case; therefore, Mr. Rehn's request that the matter be reversed
and remanded back to the trial court should be denied.
B.

Permanent Alimony

Charles Rehn also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding alimony
beyond the duration of the parties marriage. Mr. Rehn argues that, pursuant to the
language in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h),4 a specific finding by the court that
extenuating circumstances exists is necessary before an award of permanent alimony is
made. Judge Brian, in awarding alimony, noted that:

4

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1997) provides:

Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.
14

alimony has been carefully considered factoring in the length of the marriage,
disparity in the abilities of the parties to earn income, the historical roles of
both parties have played in this family during the 20-year marriage, the age of
the little children who are the primary responsibility of the Plaintiff, and all
other pertinent facts.

(Findings, Tf 38). It is clear from that statement that the circumstances of the marriage,
including the duration of the marriage, were fully considered by the court before it
awarded alimony.
In Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), Mr. Watson argued that the
trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony to his ex-wife. Using the same abuse of
discretion standard which the court of appeals applies to all alimony reviews, the court
affirmed an award of $2,000 per month in alimony for two years, and for $1,500 per
month thereafter, until "the plaintiff remarries, dies or cohabits as defined by statute, or
until further order of the court." Watson, 837 P.2d at 3. The court of appeals held that the
trial court did not abuse it's discretion by basing its award "upon [Mr. Watson's] ability
to earn, and the needs of [Mrs. Watson]." Ibid. In the present case, the findings clearly
demonstrate that Judge Brian considered the 20 year duration of the marriage, Ms. Rehn's
work history and her need to care for and nurture her children, Mr. Rehn's earning
capacity and history, and his projected earning capacity. Therefore, Ms. Rehn respectfully
argues that an award of permanent alimony in this case, when considered in light of the
trial court's findings, was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion.

15

C.

Child Support

Charles Rehn alleges that the Court made insufficient findings for a deviation from
the child support guidelines. However, Charles Rehn fails to mention that the child
support schedule used by the parties was agreed to prior to the trial and presented to the
Court as a Stipulation. Furthermore, the actual child support shedule, to which Mr. Rehn
now objects, was entered into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, without any objection by
opposing counsel. (Tr. 63-64). Therefore, the only Findings that the Court needed, or
actually made, related to the Stipulation of the parties that child support would be in the
amount of $1045. (Tr. 5 andTr. 122).
Additionally, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce
relayed the same information concerning child support, including the child support
schedule attached as an exhibit to both documents. These documents were mailed to, and
approved as to form by, Charles Rehn's counsel and returned to Mary Rehn's counsel
prior to filing with the Court. If there was a problem with the stipulated amount of child
support, that was the time for Charles Rehn to bring his objection. However, nothing was
relayed to Mary's counsel, and no objection was entered either to the Findings, the Decree,
or the child support schedule attached to those documents.
Evidently, Charles Rehn does not like the benefit of his bargain at this late date,
and so chooses to now place the blame for the child support amount at the feet of the trial
judge alleging insufficient and improper Findings.
16

D.

Debt Allocation

In attacking the trial court's allocation of marital debt between the parties, Charles
Rehn again seeks to raise factual issues generally considered within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Mr. Rehn, again, argues that there was insufficient findings to support
the division of martial debt. As is noted above, Judge Brian found that, based upon the
four to one ration in income favorable to Mr. Rehn, he should bear the substantial portion
of the marital debt. (Findings, If 8-9, 17, 22).
It is a settled issue of law, as noted above, that an appellate court will not disturb
the property and debt distribution of the trial court in a divorce action unless a clear abuse
of discretion is shown. Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah App. 1987); citing to
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). In such a case, the trial court is clearly in the
best position to weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual conclusions.
Boyley 735 P.2d at 670. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that it was not an
abuse of discretion for one party to end up with 87% of the marital debt. Hill v. Hill 869
P.2d 963, 966 (Utah App. 1994).
As has been note above, the trial court in this case carefully reviewed the evidence
before it and entered findings based upon the needs of Ms. Rehn and her children, her
ability to support her family and contribute to any marital debt, and Mr. Rehn's ability to
provide assistance in paying such debt. Ms. Rehn respectfully argues that the trial court's
findings sufficiently indicate a careful review and consideration of the evidence before the
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court and, therefore, the distribution of debt was not the result of an abuse of discretion.
E.

Attorney's Fees

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993) grants trial courts the power to award attorney
fees in divorce cases. It is settled law that when a trial court enters an award of attorney's
fees pursuant to § 30-3-3, it "must be based on evidence of the financial need of the
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees." Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App.1991). Such an award,
including the amount, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kerr v. Kerr, 610
P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1980). On appeal, the award will not be disturbed the finding
unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162
(Utah App. 1989). Failure to make adequate findings to explain the award constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
The findings clearly indicate that the Court addressed Ms. Rehn's need of
assistance with her attorney's fees, Mr. Rehn's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of
the fees. As noted above, Judge Brian, in deciding the financial issues relating to the
divorce decree, found that a ratio of 80%, attributable to Charles Rehn, and 20%,
attributable to Mary Rehn, was appropriate in light of the evidence of the parties incomes.
(Findings, If 9, 17). The Court went on to find that Mary Rehn had incurred $8,600 in
legal fees and costs (Findings, Tf 25), that these fees were necessarily incurred by Ms. Rehn
in securing a divorce, that work accomplished was reasonable in terms of time and scope,
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that the charge per hour was appropriate, and that these rates were normal based upon
attorney's with similar experience and expertise. (Findings, f 27). Continuing, the Court
found that "Plaintiff has need for assistance with her attorney's fees and Defendant has
the ability to pay." (Findings, f 26). In determining the award of attorney fees, Judge
Brian applied the 80% to 20% ratio that he used in deciding the financial issues of this
case, and awarded Ms. Rehn attorney's fees in the amount of $6,880. (Findings, ^ 28).
On appeal, Charles Rehn argues that there were insufficient findings by the trial
court to demonstrate a need by Ms. Rehn to have assistance in paying her fees. He argues
"Mary's attorney fee award is unsupported by any factual finding of need or of Charles'
(sic) [ability to pay?]." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). However, the findings indicate that
court considered the financial situation of both parties, their incomes, and Ms. Rehn's
ability to meet her and her children's obligations.
Therefore, for these reasons, Judge Brian did not abuse his discretion in awarding
attorney's fees in this case, and therefore Mr. Rehn's request that the matter be reversed
and remanded back to the trial court should be denied.
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ISSUE 2:

The trial court erred in excluding Charles Rehn's witness

regarding Mary Rehn's underemployment and income potential.
Factual Background Relating to Issue 2.
Appellant maintains in his brief that he informed Mr. Cathcart by fax two days
before trial that he intended to call a vocational expert whom he had just retained.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 23). The fax received in Mr. Cathcart's office indicates that it was
actually faxed at 17:49 (5:49 p.m.) on August 12, 1997, two days before trial. (See
Addendum B). The trial record shows that Mr. Cathcart actually received the fax sent by
Mr. Christensen at 7:30 a.m the day before trial. (Tr. 80-81). This is the first notice Mr.
Cathcart received that this witness was going to be called at the trial. (Tr. 80, 83).
Interrogatories had been served on, and answered by, Mr. Christensen and he made no
mention of any 'Vocational expert" or any expert witness of this nature. (Tr. 83). These
answers had been signed by Mr. Rehn less than two months prior to trial. While Charles
Rehn argues that the "vocational" expert was disclosed as soon as he was located and
retained (Appellant's Brief, p. 23), it should be noted that the matter had been pending
before the trial court for over seventeen months. Furthermore, the issue to which the
expert would testify — namely, Mary Rehn's earning potential relative to alimony — was
an issue that was before the Court and before counsel from the day that Plaintiffs
Complaint was originally filed on March 18th and served on March 21st of 1996. Mr.
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Christensen's only explanation for his failure to disclose or retain the witness earlier was
"we have made four or five attempts to settle this case" (Tr. 81), and in the end he
admitted "the failure to get the witness was my own responsibility." (Tr. 81).
The trial court, in two different scheduling orders, one dated July 3, 1997, and the
other dated July 16, 1997, ordered that all discovery (including responses to discovery)
and all exhibits and witness lists to completed and exchanged pursuant to deadlines and
requirements imposed by rules of court and civil procedure.5
Judge Brian, in ruling to exclude the witness, specifically found that Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure require that a party considering calling an expert witness at trial give
"timely" notice of the expert and their testimony to opposing counsel. (Tr. 84). In
addition, the Court found that the expert was not divulged to opposing counsel until about
24 hours before trial and that prejudice would occur if the expert was allowed to testify.
(Tr. 84). Specifically, the Court found that Mary Rehn would prejudiced because they
would be unable to "consult with a counter-expert, and discuss the anticipated testimony
and to obtain a counter-expert to testify" with 24 hours. (Tr. 84-85). The only other
alternative for Ms. Rehn was to continue the matter for another five months.6 (Tr. 81-83).
5

The July 3, 1997, Scheduling Order specifically requires discovery and the exchange of
exhibits and witness lists to be completed by "(as per rules)." The July 16, 1997, Scheduling
Order requires the parties to "(see prior notice)."
6

In speaking with the court clerk, Mr. Christensen was informed that the next date for
which the trial could be set was January 13, 1998, a full five months from the scheduled date of
August 14, 1997. (Tr. 80).
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Mr. Cathcart will admit that he considered continuing the matter for two or, possibly, three
months. However, to continue this matter another five months, when it had already been
pending 18 months, where there was a real financial need on the part of Ms. Rehn (not to
mention the need bring closure to the matter), was simply too prejudicial to Ms. Rehn,
particularly in light of Mr. Christensen's admission that the failure to obtain the expert
was his responsibility.
Legal Analysis Relating to Appellant's Point 2
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party in a civil matter to disclose every
person the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and the subject matter of the
expert's testimony, when requested to do so in the opposing party's interrogatories. See
Utah R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4). The rules further require that a party "seasonably" supplement
his or her responses to an opposing party's interrogatories to include "the identity of each
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial." Utah R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1)(B). In
addition to these requirements, the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires "all
discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all responses thereto, . . . no later
than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case." Utah Code Jud.Admin. Rule
4-502. The rule further requires that any discovery conducted within the thirty (30) day
period prior to trial, to be by motion of the party seeking to conduct discovery (or amend
their responses) and shall be at the discretion of the trial court. Ibid. The rule further
states:
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In exercising its discretion, the court shall take into consideration the necessity
and reasons for such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the parties
seeking discovery, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case
from going to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to any party.

Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rule 4-502 (5).
The Utah Court of Appeals also long recognized this broad discretion given to trial
courts to manage discovery in the cases pending before them. Berrett v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western R. R., 830 P.2d 291,293 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992); Maoris & Associates, Inc.
v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah.Ct.App. 1997). Furthermore, a trial
court has the discretion and power to sanction a party for failing to comply with an order
issued as the result of a discovery conference, including the power to exclude a witness
from testifying. See Utah R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2); Macris & Associates, Inc., 941 P.2d at 642;
Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293-294. On appeal, any exercise of this discretion by the trial court
will not be interfered with unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Berrett, 830 P.2d
at 293; Marcis & Associates, Inc., 941 P.2d at 642.
Charles Rehn, in support of his second issued raised on appeal, argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness because none of the scheduling
orders required witnesses be disclosed by a "certain deadline." (Appellant's Brief, 25).
In support of this proposition, Appellant cites to Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande
Western R.R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah App. 1992), which held that "absent an
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order creating a judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party by
excluding its witness under rule 37(b)(2)." In Berrett, the plaintiff disclosed an expert
witness 14 days before trial and before a deadline which had been imposed by the
defendant. Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293. The defendant, in moving to exclude the witness,
argued that despite his deadline, the plaintiffs expert should be excluded because
disclosure did not meet the trial court's earlier, more generalized, deadline.7 The Utah
Court of Appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by excluding an expert witness
under rule 37(b)(2) where there was no order creating a judicially imposed deadline for
disclosing witness lists. Ibid, at 296. In reaching its decision in Berrett, the Court of
Appeals noted the fact there was never a scheduling order in place, that the defense
counsel had previously proposed a pre-trial order which would require disclosure within
10 days of trial, and defense counsel's own conduct (by requiring disclosure at a later
date) contradicted their argument for an earlier disclosure date. Ibid, at 294-196. This
case presently before the Court of Appeals is factually distinguishable from the Berrett
case. In Berrett, the plaintiff had never disclosed a witness list to the defendant, and the
defendant has notice that there were witnesses to be called of which he had no knowledge.

7

Defendant, in Berrett relied upon the follow statement by the trial court:

"So I'm going to direct that whatever motions you are going to file that, either to compel
[discovery] or any purpose, that we ought to have those filed no later than ten days from
today [June 27th]." Berrett, 830 P.2d at 295.
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Defense counsel, in Berrett, was continually aware that he needed to obtain a list of
witnesses, including experts, who would be testifying at the trial. In the present case, Mr.
Christensen, in answering Mr. Cathcart's interrogatories, had submitted to Mr. Cathcart
a list of witnesses including only Charles Rehn and a certified public accountant. (Tr. 8283). There was never any discussion and Mr. Cathcart had no idea that Mr. Christensen
was planning to call another witness. (Tr. 83). The fax that he received in his office at
7:30 a.m. the day before trial was Mr. Cathcart's first notice that another witness was
going to be called.
Furthermore, Mr. Christensen did not give 23, 14, or even 10 days notice that he
was going to call a 'Vocational expert." Instead, Mr. Cathcart received notice at 7:30 a.m.
the day before trial. (Tr. 80-81).8 Ms. Rehn respectfully asks this Court to note that there
were four scheduling orders in the present case, as opposed to none in Berrett, and the last
two required an exchange of witness lists and a completion of discovery pursuant to the
court rules and the rules of civil procedure. Pursuant to those rules, Mr. Christensen was
required to complete discovery, including supplementing his answers to interrogatories,
within 30 days prior to trial and the failure to do so placed him squarely within the trial
court's discretion to exclude any further evidence his responses might disclose. Mr.

8

In addition to the 14 days disclosure given in the Berrett case, the Court of Appeals, in
rendering its decision in Berrett, appears to have relied on cases where the disclosure took place
at least several days before trial. See e.g. Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674 (Pa.Sup. 1982) (disclosure
took place 23 days before trial).
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Christensen, by signing his interrogatories on June 20, 1997, appeared to have complied
with these disclosure requirements. There was no reason for Mr. Cathcart or Mr.
Christensen to expect that a trial judge bound by these rules would allow either party to
supplement their responses to include another witness, particularly an expert witness.
Despite these significant factual differences, Charles Rehn argues that his eleventh
hour amendment of his witness list to include the "vocational expert" fits within the
parameters of this Court's Berrett decision and that the trial court's excluding his witness
from testifying at the trial the next day was an abuse of discretion based upon the holding
in Berrett. Appellee respectfully argues that such an interpretation of Berrett is ludicrous.
Under such an interpretation, a court could require the parties to conform to the rules of
civil procedure, rules of judicial administration, and local rules, and unless a specific ~
exact — date is given for supplementing or amending discovery requests and witness lists,
a party could add an additional expert to the list a hour before trial if they so desired.
Furthermore, the trial court, Mr. Rehn seems to argue, would have to either allow the
witness to testify at the extreme prejudice of the other party or continue the matter to a
later date. With due respect to this Court and Mr. Rehn, such an extension of the holding
in Berrett would subject attorneys and their clients to the very kind of evidentiary sabotage
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration seek to
prevent.
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For these reasons, Ms. Rehn argues that the exclusion of the "vocational" expert
was proper and not an abuse of discretion by trial court, based on Mr. Christensen's
eleventh hour notice to Mr. Cathcart his prior knowledge that the issue of Ms. Rehn's
earning capacity would be an issue at the trial, and his blatant admission that the
responsibility for obtaining this witness was his alone.

CONCLUSION
In regards to the first issue raised by Mr. Rehn on appeal, Mary Rehn asks this
Court to affirm the findings of the trial court relating to alimony, child support, the
allocation of marital debt, and the award of attorney's fees. Furthermore, Ms. Rehn
requests this Court affirm the trial court's exclusion of the expert witness.
Finally, should Ms. Rehn prevail on appeal, she respectfully requests this Court
grant her an award of her reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with her appeal.
"Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then
substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Burt
v. Burt} 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.1990); Carouse v. Carouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah
App. 1991). When an appeal involves multiple issues, the party receiving attorney fees
below need not prevail on every issue in order to be awarded fees on appeal. Bell v. Bell,
810 P.2d489,494 (Utah App. 1991); Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App.1990).
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ADDENDUM A

30-3-1
Section
30-3-11.1.
30-3-11.2.
30-3-11.3.

30-3-12.
30-3-13.
30-3-13.1.
30-3-14.
30-3-14.1.
30-3-15.
30-3-15.1.

30-3-15.2.
30-3-15.3.
30-3-15.4.
30-3-16.
30-3-16.1.
30-3-16.2.
30-3-16.3.
30-3-16.4.
30-3-16.5.
30-3-16.6.
30-3-16.7.
30-3-17.
30-3-17.1.
30-3-18.

30-3-19 to
30-3-32.
30-3-33.
30-3-34.
30-3-35.
30-3-35.5.
30-3-36.
30-3-37.
30-3-38.

HUSBAND AND WIFE
Family Court Act — Purpose.
Appointment of counsel for child.
Mandatory educational course for divorcing
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Exceptions.
Courts to exercise family counseling powers.
Repealed.
Establishment of family court division of district court.
Repealed.
Designation of judges — Terms.
Repealed.
Appointment of domestic relations counselors,
family court commissioner, and ass ;e * Qr »ts
and clerks.
Repealed.
Commissioners — Powers.
Salaries and expenses.
Repealed.
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers.
Petition for conciliation.
Contents of petition.
Procedure upon filing of petition.
Fees.
Information not available to public.
Effect of petition — Pendency of action.
Power and jurisdiction of judge.
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written
evaluation by counselor.
Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and
education services not to be construed as
condonation or promotion.
30-3-31. Repealed.
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions.
Advisory guidelines.
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5
to 18 years of age.
Minimum schedule for visitation for children
under five years of age.
Special circumstances.
Relocation.
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation Enforcement.

30-3-1. P r o c e d u r e — R e s i d e n c e — G r o u n d s .
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as
provided in this chapter.
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where t h e
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide
resident of this state and of the county where the action is
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of
the action.
(3) Grounds for divorce:
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of marriage;
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent
to marriage;
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent
for more than one year;
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(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the
petitioner the common necessaries of life;
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent;
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony;
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental
distress to the petitioner;
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately
u n d e r a decree of separate maintenance of any state for
three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for
separate maintenance previously granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of
insanity unless:
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior
to the commencement of the action; and
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is
incurable,
(bj The court shall appoint for the respondent a guardian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respondent. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the
county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state,
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and
m a k e a defense as is j u s t to protect the rights of the
respondent and the interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction
over t h e payment of alimony, the distribution of property,
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as
t h e courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of
t h e respondent by two or more competent physicians, to
determine the mental condition of t h e respondent. For
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent
m a y be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be
apportioned by the court.
1997
30*3-2. R i g h t of h u s b a n d t o d i v o r c e .
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife
for the same causes and in the same m a n n e r as the wife may
obtain a divorce from her husband.
195S
30-3-3.

Award of costs, a t t o r n e y a n d w i t n e s s f e e s —
Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
t h e court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The
order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, t h e court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining t h a t the party substantially prevailed upon the
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if t h e court finds the party
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. j m pecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), t h e court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
D a r ty and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during t h e course of
the action or in the final order or judgment.
1993
30-3-4* P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — D e c r e e — Use of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence t a k e n in the
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree m a y be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court.
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to the court. The court m a y waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decTee upon t h e evidence or, in t h e case of a decree
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings h a s applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

D i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y — M a i n t e n a n c e a n d
h e a l t h c a r e of p a r t i e s a n d c h i l d r e n — Divis i o n of d e b t s — C o u r t t o h a v e c o n t i n u i n g
j u r i s d i c t i o n — Custody a n d v i s i t a t i o n — Det e r m i n a t i o n of a l i m o n y — N o n m e r i t o r i o u s p e tition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines t h a t the
circumstances are appropriate and t h a t the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision,
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under
this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in t h a t action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living t h a t existed at the time of
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living t h a t existed at
the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living.
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(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer
than the number of years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the
action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
1997
30-3-5.1. P r o v i s i o n for i n c o m e w i t h h o l d i n g i n c h i l d
s u p p o r t order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
1997
30-3-5.2.
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A l l e g a t i o n s of c h i l d a b u s e or child s e x u a l
abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or
child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court
shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division
of Child and Family Services within the Department of
Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A
final award of custody or visitation may not be rendered until
a report on that investigation is received by the court. That
investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and

Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and
request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the
court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
1996
30-3-5.5,30-3-6.

Repealed.

I99iv 1998

30-3-7. W h e n d e c r e e b e c o m e s a b s o l u t e .
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who
have a child or children have completed attendance at the
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided in
Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the
parties, upon determination that course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties;
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending; or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute,
for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for
good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated
period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the decree.
1994

30-3-8. R e m a r r i a g e — W h e n u n l a w f u l .
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their
marriage by decree may marry any person other than the
spouse from whom the divorce was granted until it becomes
absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not absolute until
after affirmance of the decree.
1988
30-3-9.
30-3-10.

Repealed.

1969

C u s t o d y of c h i l d r e n i n c a s e of s e p a r a t i o n or
divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it considers appropriate. In determining
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of
each of the parties. The court may inquire-of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the
future custody, but the expressed desires are not controlling
and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most
likely to act in the best interests of the child, including
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody
of the child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish
custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into
consideration in determining whether to award custody to the
other parent.
(4) (a) A court may not discriminate against a parent due
to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding
custody or determining whether a substantial change has
occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in
awarding custody or determining whether a substantial
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an
award of custody, the parent with a disability may rebut
any evidence, presumption, or inference arising therefrom
by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
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(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
iding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
ideals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
\ppeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988

78-3-4 :

78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
1986
CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Transfer of court operating responsibilities —
Facilities — Staff — Budget.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.2.
District court case management.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and
responsibilities.
78-3-25.
Assistants for administrator of the courts —
Appointment of trial court executives.
78-3-26.
Courts to provide information and statistical
data to administrator of the courts.
78-3-27.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-28.
Repealed.
78-3-29.
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge —
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers
— Duties.
78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule.

;$.2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
J3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
joe vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
^ r t for original appellate review and determination any
letter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
^diction.
'*) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
^ i *n its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1996

78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office forjudges of the district courts is six years, and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified.
1988

2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e Court.
Keview of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
v^Peals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
^Preme Court.
1986

78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.

78-3-1 t o 78-3-2.

Repealed.

1971, 1981, 1988
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, t h a t notice be
given in such m a n n e r as the court may direct to some or all of
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring t h a t
the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations
as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from
time to time.
(e) D i s m i s s a l or c o m p r o m i s e . A class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.
R u l e 23.1. D e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n s b y s h a r e h o l d e r s .
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders
or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an
unincorporated association, the corporation or association
having failed to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complainant shall be verified and shall
allege (1) t h a t the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at
the time of the transaction of which he complains or t h a t his
share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation
of law, and (2) t h a t the action is not a collusive one to confer
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors or comparable authority
and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the
reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears t h a t the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or
members in such m a n n e r as the court directs.
R u l e 24. I n t e r v e n t i o n .
(a) I n t e r v e n t i o n of right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a s t a t u t e
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or t r a n s action which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
t h a t the disposition of the action may as a practical m a t t e r
impair or impede his ability to protect t h a t interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
(b) P e r m i s s i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n . Upon timely application
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
s t a t u t e confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any s t a t u t e or
executive order administered by a governmental officer or
agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive
order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be
permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
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(c) P r o c e d u r e . A person desiring to intervene shall serve a
motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5.
The motions shall state the grounds therefor and shall be
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense
for which intervention is sought.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
R u l e 25. S u b s t i t u t i o n of p a r t i e s .
(a) D e a t h .
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper
parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any
party or by the successors or representatives of the
deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing,
shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and
upon persons not parties in the m a n n e r provided in Rule
4 for the service of a summons. Unless the motion for
substitution is made not later t h a n ninety days after the
death is suggested upon the record by service of a statem e n t of t h e fact of the death as provided herein for the
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to
the deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the
plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants in an action
in which the right sought to be enforced survives only to
the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving
defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be
suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in
favor of or against the surviving parties.
(b) I n c o m p e t e n c y . If a party becomes incompetent, the
court upon motion served as provided in Subdivision (a) of this
rule may allow the action to be continued by or against his
representative.
(c) Transfer of i n t e r e s t . In case of any transfer of interest,
the action may be continued by or against the original party,
unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined
with t h e original party. Service of the motion shall be made as
provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule.
(d) P u b l i c officers; d e a t h or s e p a r a t i o n from office.
When a public officer is a party to an action and during its
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the
action may be continued and maintained by or against his
successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it
is satisfactorily shown to the court that" there is a substantial
need for so continuing and maintaining it. Substitution purs u a n t to this rule may be made when it is shown by supplemental pleading t h a t the successor of an officer adopts or
continues or t h r e a t e n s to adopt or continue the action of his
predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer
to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be
given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to object.
PARTV.
DEPOSITIONS A N D DISCOVERY.
R u l e 26. G e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n s g o v e r n i n g discovery.
(a) D i s c o v e r y m e t h o d s . Parties may obtain discovery by
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral
examination or written questions; written interrogatories;
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon
land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) D i s c o v e r y s c o p e a n d limits. Unless otherwise limited
by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope
of discovery is as follows:
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(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to
the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods
set forth in Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if
it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own
initiative after reasonable notice or p u r s u a n t to a motion
under Subdivision (c).
(2) I n s u r a n c e a g r e e m e n t s . A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment. Information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence
at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for
insurance shall not be treated as p a r t of an insurance
agreement.
(3) Trial p r e p a r a t i o n : Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for t h a t other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing t h a t the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of t h e materials in
the preparation of his case and t h a t he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter
previously made by t h a t party. Upon request, a person not
a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter
previously made by t h a t person. If the request is refused,
the person may move for a court order. The provisions of
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in
relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a
statement previously made is (A) a written statement
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person
making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the
person making it and contemporaneously recorded.

Rule 26

(4) Trial p r e p a r a t i o n : E x p e r t s . Discovery of facts
known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or
for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person
whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify, and to
state the substance of the facts and opinions to
which the expert is expected to testify and a
s u m m a r y of the grounds for each opinion.
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further
discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to
Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions
held by an expert who has been retained or specially
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected
to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in
Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require t h a t the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery under
Subdivisions (b)(4XA)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under
Subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may
require, and with respect to discovery obtained
under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court
shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay
the other party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party
in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(c) P r o t e c t i v e o r d e r s . Upon motion by a party or by the
person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) t h a t the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time
or place;
(3) t h a t the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other t h a n t h a t selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(4) t h a t certain matters not be inquired into, or t h a t the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) t h a t discovery be conducted with no one present
except persons designated by the court;
(6) t h a t a deposition after being sealed be opened only
by order of the court;
(7) t h a t a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be disclosed
or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) t h a t the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.
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If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in
part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just,
order t h a t any party or person provide or permit discovery.
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) S e q u e n c e and t i m i n g of discovery. Unless the court
upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and
in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact t h a t a party
is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise,
shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n of r e s p o n s e s . A party who has
responded to a request for discovery with a response t h a t was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his
response to include information thereafter acquired, except as
follows:
( D A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement
his response with respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of
each person expected to be called as an expert witness at
trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify,
and the substance of his testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior
response if he obtains information upon the basis of which
(A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made,
or (B) he knows that the response though correct when
made is no longer true and the circumstances are such
that a failure to amend the response is in substance a
knowing concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by
order of the court, agreement of the parties, or at any time
prior to trial through new requests for supplementation of
prior responses.
(f) D i s c o v e r y conference. At any time after commencement of an action, the court may direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of
discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by the attorney
for any party if the motion includes:
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery;
and
(5) a statement showing t h a t the attorney making the
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement
with opposing attorneys on the m a t t e r s set forth in the
motion. Each party and his attorney are under a duty to
participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan
if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice
of the motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or
additions to matters set forth in the motion shall be
served not later than ten days after service of the motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an
order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes,
establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters,
including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the
proper management of discovery in the action. An order may
be altered or amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a
discovery conference to prompt convening of the conference,
the court may combine the discovery conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16.
(g) S i g n i n g of discovery r e q u e s t s , r e s p o n s e s , a n d obj e c t i o n s . Every request for discovery or response or objection
thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
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represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or
objection and state his address. The signature of the attorney
or party constitutes a certification t h a t he has read the
request, response, or objection and t h a t to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to h a r a s s or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of Utigation; and (3)
not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given
the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is
not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the party
making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall
not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is
signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) D e p o s i t i o n w h e r e a c t i o n p e n d i n g i n another
state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another state
may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the
same m a n n e r and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state,
provided t h a t in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the
taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the
court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to
be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that
all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which
by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be
submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is
being taken.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
Rule 27. D e p o s i t i o n s b e f o r e a c t i o n o r p e n d i n g appeal.
(a) Before a c t i o n .
(1) P e t i t i o n . A person who desires to perpetuate his
own testimony or t h a t of another person regarding any
matter t h a t may be cognizable in any court of this state
may file a verified petition in the district court of the
county in which any expected adverse party may reside.
The petition shall be entitled in the n a m e of the
petitioner and shall show: (1) t h a t the petitioner expects
to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of this state
but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be
brought, (2) the subject m a t t e r of the expected action and
his interest therein, (3) the facts which he desires to
establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for
desiring to perpetuate it, (4) the n a m e s or a description of
the persons he expects will be adverse parties and their
addresses so far as known, and (5) the n a m e s and addresses of t h e persons to be examined and the substance
of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and
shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take
the depositions of the persons to be examined named in
the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.
(2) N o t i c e a n d s e r v i c e . The petitioner shall thereafter serve a notice upon each person named in the petition
as an expected adverse party, together with a copy of the
petition, stating t h a t the petitioner will apply to the court,
at a time and place named therein, for the order described
in the petition. At least 20 days before the date of hearing
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him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose
of t h e pending action only and is not an admission by him for
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other
proceeding.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
R u l e 37. Failure to m a k e or c o o p e r a t e in d i s c o v e r y ;
sanctions.
(a) M o t i o n for order c o m p e l l i n g discovery. A party,
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as
follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to
a party may be made to the court in which the action is
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the
court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a
party shall be made to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, t h e
discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. When taking a
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the
question may complete or adjourn the examination before
he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may
m a k e such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made p u r s u a n t to Rule 26(c).
(3) E v a s i v e or i n c o m p l e t e a n s w e r . For purposes of
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be
treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of e x p e n s e s of m o t i o n . If the motion is
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds t h a t the opposition to the
motion was substantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing t h e motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds t h a t the making of the
motion was substantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a
j u s t manner.
(b) F a i l u r e to comply w i t h order.
(1) S a n c t i o n s by court in district w h e r e d e p o s i t i o n is t a k e n . If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer
a question after being directed to do so by the court in t h e
district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure
may be considered a contempt of t h a t court.
(2) S a n c t i o n s by court in w h i c h a c t i o n is p e n d i n g .
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)
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to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made
u n d e r Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court
in which the action is pending may m a k e such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the
following:
(A) an order t h a t the m a t t e r s regarding which the
order was made or any other designated facts shall be
t a k e n to be established for the purposes of the action
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
t h e order;
(B) a n order refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any
p a r t thereof, or rendering a j u d g m e n t by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of
court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or m e n t a l examination;
(E) where a party h a s failed to comply with an
order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce
another for examination, such orders as are listed in
P a r a g r a p h s (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision,
unless the party failing to comply shows t h a t he is
unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the p a r t y failing to obey
the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by
t h e failure, unless the court finds t h a t the failure was
substantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(c) E x p e n s e s o n failure t o a d m i t . If a party fails to admit
t h e genuineness of any document or t h e t r u t h of any matter as
requested under Rule 36, and if t h e party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document
or t h e t r u t h of the matter, he m a y apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable
expenses incurred in making t h a t proof, including reasonable
attorney's fees. The court shall m a k e t h e order unless it finds
t h a t (1) t h e request was held objectionable p u r s u a n t to Rule
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable
ground to believe t h a t he might prevail on the matter, or (4)
t h e r e w a s other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) F a i l u r e of party t o a t t e n d a t o w n d e p o s i t i o n or
s e r v e a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s o r r e s p o n d t o request
for i n s p e c t i o n . If a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the
officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request
for inspection submitted under Rule 34. after proper service of
t h e request, the court in which the action is pending on motion
may m a k e such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others it may take any action authorized under Parag r a p h s (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by
the failure, unless the court finds t h a t the failure was sub-
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gtantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award
of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be
excused on the ground t h a t the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective
order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) F a i l u r e to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e framing of a discovery plan. If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is
required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused
by the failure.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
PART VI.
TRIALS.
Rule 38. J u r y trial of right.
(a) R i g h t p r e s e r v e d . The right of trial by jury as declared
by the constitution or as given by s t a t u t e shall be preserved to
the parties.
(b) D e m a n d . Any party may demand a trial by jury of any
issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and
not later t h a n 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a
pleading of the party.
(c) S a m e : S p e c i f i c a t i o n of i s s u e s . In his demand a party
may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he
shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the
issues so triable. If he h a s demanded trial by jury for only
some of the issues, any other party, within 10 days after
service of the demand or such lesser time as the court may
order, may serve a demand for trial by j u r y of any other or all
of the issues of fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee,
to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by
jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may
not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
Rule 39. Trial b y j u r y or b y t h e court.
(a) By jury. When trial by jury h a s been demanded as
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the
register of actions as a j u r y action. The trial of all issues so
demanded shall be by jury, unless
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation
made in open court and entered in the record, consent to
trial by the court sitting without a jury, or
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds
that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues
does not exist, or
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) By t h e court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court
HI its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
°r all issues.
(c) A d v i s o r y j u r y a n d trial b y c o n s e n t . In all actions not
friable of right by a j u r y the court upon motion or of its own
mitiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with t h e
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
v
erdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a m a t t e r

°f right.
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R u l e 40. A s s i g n m e n t of c a s e s for trial; c o n t i n u a n c e .
(a) Order a n d p r e c e d e n c e . The district courts shall provide by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar
(1) without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) P o s t p o n e m e n t of t h e trial. Upon motion of a party,
the court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence
would be given, and t h a t it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) T a k i n g t e s t i m o n y of w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t . If required
by the adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such
postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness
present taken, in the same m a n n e r as if at the trial; and the
testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made
with respect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule
32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)].
R u l e 4 1 . D i s m i s s a l of a c t i o n s .
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) B y plaintiff; b y s t i p u l a t i o n . Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable
statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer
or of a motion for s u m m a r y judgment, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except t h a t a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state an action based on or including the same claim.
(2) B y o r d e r of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall
not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) I n v o l u n t a r y dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground t h a t upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff h a s shown no right to relief. The court as trier
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
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(vi) any co-signors or indemnitors that will be
required; and
(vii) the conditions under which the bond may be
exonerated and the collateral returned.
(6) Disqualification.
(A) Informal resolution of complaints. Whenever it is
alleged that a surety has engaged in unprofessional
conduct, the Board shall notify the surety in writing of the
allegations. The surety shall respond to the allegations in
writing within ten days.
(B) Formal resolution of complaints. If the surety fails
to respond to the notice provided pursuant to paragraph
(6)(A), or if the Board determines that formal action is
necessary, the Board shall require the surety to appear
before the Board at a time and place certain to respond to
the allegations. Both the initial notice and the notice of
formal action shall be served upon the surety by mailing
the same, via certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the surety's last known address on file with the Board. No
answer or other responsive pleading is required to the
notice of formal action. Discovery is prohibited, but the
Board may request production of documentary evidence.
All parties to the proceeding shall have access to information contained in the file maintained by the Board and to
all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted by law. The board shall
conduct a hearing at the time and place set forth in the
notice of formal action. The hearing shall be open to all
parties to the proceeding. The surety may be represented
by counsel and shall be permitted to testify, present
evidence, and comment on the allegations. The Board may
record the hearing, and any party, at its own expense,
may have a transcriber approved by the Board prepare a
transcript from the record. Within ten days after the close
of the hearing, the Board shall issue a written decision
which may be to continue the surety's qualification without change; to continue the surety's qualification subject
to such restrictions, limitations or requirements as the
Board deems appropriate; to suspend the surety's qualification pending compliance with specified criteria; or to
disqualify the surety. The decision shall be based on the
facts appearing in the file maintained by the Board and
the facts presented in evidence at the hearing. The
decision shall include the reasons therefore, notice of any
right of review, and the time limit for filing for such a
review. The decision shall be served upon the surety by
mailing the same, via first class mail, to the surety's last
known address on file with the Board. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Board may file a petition for
judicial review within thirty days after the date of the
decision. Judicial review shall be governed by the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.
(Repealed and reenacted effective November 15, 1995.)
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
lb designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are
hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley
City.

(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of
record may hold court in any location designated by this rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992; amended effective November 15, 1995.)
I
Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility
trial courts.
Intent:

for administration of

lb designate the court locations administered directly
through the administrative office of the courts and those
administered through contract with local government pursuant to § 78-3-21.
Applicability:

[

This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the
administrative office of the courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered
directly through the administrative office of the courts.
(2) All locations of the district and circuit courts shall be
admimstered directly through the administrative office of the
courts, except the following, which shall be administered
through contract with county or municipal government pursuant to § 78-3-21: Beaver, Castle Dale, Coalville, Fillmore,
Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, Panguitch,
Park City, Randolph, and Salem.
(Added effective November 15, 1995.)
ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
Tb establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:

[

This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and small
claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:

I

(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page
number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or .
other documents relied upon in support of the motion.
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an
ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in
excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum
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in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documen
tation If the responding party fails to file a memorandum
in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in
paragraph (l)(d) of this rule
(c) R e p l y m e m o r a n d u m . The moving party may
serve and file a reply memorandum within five days after
service of the responding party s memorandum
(d) N o t i c e to submit for d e c i s i o n . Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum,
either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to
the court for decision The notification shall be in the form
of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to
Submit for Decision" The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties If neither party files a
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision
(2) M o t i o n s for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t .
(a) M e m o r a n d u m in s u p p o r t of a m o t i o n . The
points and authorities in support of a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section t h a t contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which movant
contends no genuine issue exists The facts shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies
(b) M e m o r a n d u m in o p p o s i t i o n to a m o t i o n . The
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
s u m m a r y judgment shall begin with a section t h a t contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed fact
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's
facts t h a t are disputed All material facts set forth in the
m o v a n t s statement and properly supported by an accur a t e reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement
(3) H e a r i n g s .
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the
parties as provided m paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the
principal memorandum m support of or in opposition to a
motion may file a written request for a hearing
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds
t h a t (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous
or (b) t h a t the dispositive issue or set of issues governing
t h e granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court
shall notify the requesting party When a request for
hearing is granted, the court shall set the m a t t e r for
hearing or notify the requesting party t h a t the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the
m a t t e r for hearing and notify all parties of the date and
time
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and
authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the m a t t e r
at least two working days before the date set for hearing
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and
indicate the date and time of the hearing Courtesy copies
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court
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(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at th*
time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearinp
on the motion shall be deemed waived
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirtv
(30) days before the scheduled trial date No dispositive
motions shall be heard after t h a t date without leave of the
Court
(4) E x p e d i t e d d i s p o s i t i o n s . Upon motion and notice and
for good cause shown the court may grant a request for an
expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence
and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be
impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant
legal issues and could be resolved summarily
(5) T e l e p h o n e c o n f e r e n c e . The court on its own motion or
at a party s request may direct arguments of an} motion b\
telephone conference without court appearance A verbatim
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the
rulings thereon if requested by counsel
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15, 1990, April 15, 1991, Novem
ber 1, 1996 )
R u l e 4-502. D i s c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e s i n civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery docu
ments
Tb establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30
days of trial
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Juvenile Courts
S t a t e m e n t of t h e Rule:
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36
of the U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discoven
requests with the clerk of the court, but shall file only the
original certificate of service stating t h a t the discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of
service The responding party shall file a similar certificate
with the clerk of the court
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the
original with a copy of the proof of service affixed to it and
serve a copy of the discovery request and proof of service upon
the opposing party or counsel The party responding to the
discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the
proof of service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel
The discovery requests and response shall not be filed with the
clerk of the court unless the court on motion and notice and for
good cause shown so orders
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a
discovery request or a motion which relies upon the discoven
response shall attach a copy of the discovery request or
response which is at issue in the motion
(4) Depositions taken p u r s u a n t to the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the court except as
provided in this Code or upon order of the court for good cau«e
shown
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovers pr°"
ceedmgs in accordance with this rule All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all responses thereto and
all depositions and other documents filed with the court no
later t h a n thirtv (30) days before the date set for trial of the
case The right to conduct discovery proceedings within thirt>
(30) days before trial shall be within the discretion of the
court Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) davs
before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case
upon notice to the other parties in the action In exercising *
discretion, the court shall take into consideration the neces-
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sity and reasons for such discovery, the diligence or lack of
diligence of the parties seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial
on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to any party.
\fothing herein shall preclude or limit the voluntary exchange
of information or discovery by stipulation of the parties at any
mne prior to the date set for trial, but in no event shall such
exchanges or stipulations require a court to g r a n t a continuance of the trial date.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996.)

Rule 4-503. R e q u e s t s for j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s .
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting and requesting jury instructions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Justice Courts.
Statement of t h e Rule:
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented to the
court five days prior to the scheduled trial date unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in its discretion, may
allow the presentation of jury instructions at any time prior to
the submission of the case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the court, a copy of the requested instructions shall
be furnished to opposing counsel.
(2) J u r y instruction requests must be in writing and state
in full the instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a
separate sheet of paper, the original and copies of which shall
be free from red lines and firm names and shall be entitled:
"Instruction No.

"

The number of the request shall be written in lead pencil.
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested
instruction, at least one copy of the requested instruction
furnished to the court shall be submitted without the citations. Citations may be provided upon separate sheets attached to the particular instruction to which the citation
applies.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15, 1990; November 1, 1996.)
Rule 4-504. Written orders, j u d g m e n t s a n d d e c r e e s .
Intent:

Rule 4-505

(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall
be served upon the opposing party and proof of such service
shall be filed with the court. All judgments, orders, and
decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted after
signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes
and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the
court's own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record
in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and
decrees shall contain, if known, the judgment debtor's address
or last known address and social security number.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate
documents and shall not include any matters by reference
unless otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting
judgments or decrees may be made a part of the documents
containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been
rendered upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or
plaintiff's counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of
all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a
settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not
been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15, 1990; April 15,1991; April 15,
1995.)
I
R u l e 4-505. A t t o r n e y fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for
affidavits in support of attorney fees.
Applicability:

To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written
orders, judgments, and decrees to the court. This rule is not
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.

This rule shall govern the award of attorney fees in the trial
courts.
I

Applicability:

(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must
be filed with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis
for the award, the nature of the work performed by the
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the m a t t e r to the
stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the
reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than attorneys, for time spent, work completed and
hourly rate billed.
(3) If the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services
rendered to a person or entity who has been assigned an
interest in a claim for the purpose of collection or hired by the
obligee to collect a debt, the affidavit shall also state t h a t the
attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof in
violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.
(4) Ifjudgment is being taken by default for a principal sum
which it is expected will require considerable additional work
to collect, the following phrase may be included in the judg-

This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of
record except small claims.
Statement of t h e Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties
obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a
shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the
ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders.
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and
counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature
within fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal.

S t a t e m e n t of t h e Rule:
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August 12, 1997
r

TenyL. Catheart
Attorney at Law
380 North 200 West, #103
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Re:

Rehn v. Rehn
Civil No. 964300048 DA

Dear Teny:
I do not believe I have received the last pay stubfrommy client yet It does show
a pay increase to $82,000.00 annually. I will try to get that to you tomorrow.
The last offer was my client's best and last offer. I plan to call the following
witnesses at trial in addition to the parties:
L Cory Webster, C.P.A. totestifyon tax issues affecting support; and
2. Jim White, Assistant Director of the Career Services Dept at the University of
Utah to establish the reasonable income potential for a person with Mary's background.

Henrfolt Nfcteit & Christen***
August 12,1997

*ml
I expect the testimoay of the two experts to each be less than an hour. If you have
any questions on any of these issues, please call.
Very truly yours,

cc:

Charlie Rdm

